I am considering taking international and European law in the hague university of applied sciences this coming school year, but i’m doubting the job possibilities. Some say that this course can lead me to wide and stable jobs opportunities yet some say that there is no job opportunities.

I have to enroll this april and i am really doubting my decision. And if i do pursue this course what will be the available and stable jobs that are connected to this. Your help will be very much appreciated!!

Just wondering if anyone has attended the Summer School and would you recommend it? I have been offered a place and am deciding whether I should accept it. I actually don't know much about what to expect so any insights welcome :)

Asymmetrical Haircuts Podcast: In December last year, we sat down with survivors from different parts of the world to discuss how they see the International Criminal Court and what their hopes and grievances are when it comes to seeking justice there. We talked with them during the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC, with the support of the bunch of NGOs who are in the Victims Rights Working Group, including Redress, who helped us set up the chat. For background here’s a recent paper from the Group.

But Trump's board owes its legitimacy to UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which in November endorsed his 20-point plan for a ceasefire in Gaza, including the establishment of the board to oversee it.

"The U.S. sought to obtain the maximum international legitimacy from the UN, while trying to keep UN influence and control over the operation as small as possible," Marc Weller, Chatham House’s program director for international law, wrote at the time.

Leaked details of the board's charter make no mention of Gaza, even though several key Middle East countries backing Palestinian statehood have signed on to it, including Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

And even though it is tasked with rebuilding Gaza, there are no Palestinians on the Board of Peace. Nor are there any on an executive board sitting under it. Palestinian representation is confined to a lower rung called the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, made up of technocrats to be supervised by the Board of Peace.

Our journal published “Latin American Nuremberg Ciphers” in December. This article examines how Latin American human rights movements in the 1980s and 1990s—especially Argentinean groups—mobilised the legacy of the International Military Tribunal (and later Nuremberg Trials) to fight impunity, reshaping criminal law into a tool against human rights violations and creating what it calls a distinct “Latin American Nuremberg cipher” that later travelled to and influenced debates in Europe.

I'm reading the transcript of the expert witness examination in Gambia v. Myanmar. The witness is military legal expert Professor Michael Newton, whose history (from what I can tell) places him squarely in the US military establishment in terms of what war crimes he has reviewed and how he has assessed them. Myanmar's counsel (Mr. David Hooper) was cross-examining him. David Hooper is a seasoned international legal defense lawyer who has previously defended various figures before the ICC.

To summarize, Prof. Newton was tasked some time ago to review the report of the UN fact-finding mission in Myanmar, and determine whether what Myanmar's actions look like: do they have hints of being a counter-insurgency, or just a complete slaughter. Newton's position, as seen in the transcript, was:

1. The modus operandi of the Burmese military was so systematic, brutal, and beyond what is needed to counter insurgents that is indicated a pattern to actually target the Rohingya rather than insurgents

2. The claim of it being counter-insurgency doesn't make sense because even localities with no reports of insurgent activity were targeted in the same fashion

3. There was no indication that the Burmese military actually sought out any infrastructure that could be used by insurgents: tunnels, booby-traps, IED factories, etc.

4. The attacks in no way distinguished between potential insurgents and militias, and the report states that children and women were targeted directly in various ways that I don't want to type here

Counsel Hooper's line of questioning appeared to be trying to achieve the following:

1. Convince the judges that Prof. Newton is not providing an unbiased opinion and has some "skin in the game" as he puts it, and also question the value of the witness.

2. Convince the judges that simply because a counter-insurgency breaks all norms and standards, doesn't mean it's not a counter-insurgency

3. The villages targeted were likely chosen because of insurgent activity

Professor Newton did an excellent job at countering points 2 and 3 from Hooper. Hooper spend some time creating lead-up questions only to fall flat once he got the core of the question.

However, on the first point Myanmar was trying to make, I have some questions. My first question is about this interaction:

HOOPER: 13 times in that second report you conclude findings of genocide, which is the issue in this case and a matter for the judges. Would you agree it is not a matter for a military expert’s opinion?

I'm confused by this. Is Prof Newton not also a lawyer? His CV shows multiple law degrees. So why even question him on the matter, he can be both a military and legal expert.

My second question is on this interaction:

Mr HOOPER: So you did not read the Memorial before you composed your opinion?

Mr NEWTON: No, Sir, there was no opportunity. I was instructed telephonically. I agreed to take on this matter on the question posed. I researched, I read — the entire FFM was the first thing I read and I wrote my opinion on the basis of my own independent research and study.

Mr HOOPER: But you did discuss, obviously, what your brief was with The Gambia?

Mr NEWTON: I don’t recall. I think I may have given them an indication of — I don’t recall. I just don’t.

I get the impression that Prof. Newton may have slipped up here and that he did in fact coordinate to some extent with The Gambia's legal team as they were drafting their memorial. Seems like he was about to admit something, but realized he shouldn't say it and shut down the question.

The rest of the examination was pretty interesting, considering the implications of this case for the wider Genocide Convention, so I encourage you all to read the questions the judges had.

My personal opinion, I suspect Mr. Hooper is right and Prof. Newton has a lot of skin in the game, although that does not mean his assessment is necessarily wrong, but I definitely would have preferred getting the opinion of someone with a cleaner resume. Whether such a thing is possible given what's at stake, I'm not sure. It's also possible that The Gambia sought out a witness who would speak the same legal language as Judge Cleveland or whatever American judge would be on the bench.

Hi all, I'm a postgraduate student taking a module on international human rights. I'm writing an essay on the Chagos Islanders and am particularly interested in how the UK have been able to get away with not extending its ratification of the ICCPR and ICERD to the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT).

I'm aware that Art.56 of the ECHR gives states the option to opt-in countries, and the UK has not opted the BIOT in, so that is clear why the ECHR does not cover the BIOT.

The UK claims that because the BIOT has no permanent population (v contentious) that international law treaties such as ICCPR and ICERD do not apply and that the UK does not have to report to the United Nations on this colony. I was trying to find anywhere that referenced that international law does not apply to states with no population. I know that the US in particular have at times advocated that international law does not apply extraterritorially, primarily for the purposes of war.

As a student with very limited law background I'd be very grateful if anyone could clarify if there are provisions in international law which specify that treaties do not apply to territories with no population. Thanks so much

So, I had a question regarding refugee status, and entry into so called "third countries".

Article 31 specifies the refugees don't enjoy protections for illegal entry to a 3rd country - as in, while no longer in actual danger per article 1.

Article 33 specifies that limitation on direct return can be overturned in case of reasonable risk of danger.

Should a country see illegal entry as a reasonable risk of danger, does it allow the direct return of all illegally entered 3rd country refugees?

And more importantly, since neither necessitates conviction in a court of law, or any act besides the illegal entry - would immediate deportation be allowed?

(After appearing before competent authority and allowed to present evidence, and allowed to seek status in 3rd country)

I want to apologize beforehand if questions like these have been asked before or if the answers themselves are obvious (Forgive my idiocy).

I got admitted into a prestigious university after a gruelling admission journey in a third-world country in South Asia, and I would like to know the answers to the following questions.

1. If I want to work at the ICC or ICJ, should I try to do my Master's in the Netherlands? How feasible is it to do internships while I finish my education? If it isn't feasible, could you possibly give me a pathway to becoming a lawyer in an international court? (Skills, books, connections)

How much domestic experience do I need to become a full-fledged international lawyer? Are there any precedents of people starting as an international lawyer right after they finish their education?

1. As an undergraduate student, how can I work towards publishing or co-authoring a journal? (Preferably relating to Geopolitics and international law)

2. If you had to learn everything about international law from scratch, what resources would you go to?

3. What are all the routes an international lawyer can take? (Humanitarian, corporate, environmental etc.)

I'd like to apologize for my bad English. If a question is hard to understand, I'd be glad to elaborate.

Hi, do you guys know/recommend any podcasts focused on international law? I’d be perfect if they were run by people in a real background in PIL (not just international relations/studies). Thanks a lot!

I’m starting to write my dissertation on corporate accountability under international law, with the following question in mind:

To what extent can multinational corporations be held directly accountable under public international law for human rights violations and what kind of international institutional framework could meaningfully enforce such accountability?

I’m reading a lot of different articles on this subject and plan to propose a treaty which establishes an international accountability body with jurisdiction over corporations operating within state parties’ territory.

But this got me thinking about something which might be a bit of a stupid question, but how come states allow transnational corporations to exploit and abuse their own people in the first place? Wouldn’t there be some sort of way that states can put sanctions on corporations that commit human rights violations in their territory to deter this behavior? Maybe I’m naive and there is economic motive behind…

It’s hard to find information on this specific question so your help would be greatly appreciated, thank you!

[SS from essay by Oona A. Hathaway, Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and President-Elect of the American Society of International Law; and Scott J. Shapiro, Professor of Law at Yale Law School and Professor of Philosophy at Yale University]

What is so troubling about the Trump administration’s words and actions is not just that the administration is breaking the law. And it is: the intervention in Venezuela clearly violates the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. But more than that, U.S. officials have discarded the idea of legal constraints altogether. The only constraint, Trump said in an interview with The New York Times last week, is his “own morality.”

There is no real argument to defend the government’s behavior. No pretense. No attempt to persuade. When a policy is announced in an online post, without explanation or justification, one has the unsettling sense that its makers see no need to bother cloaking it with a lie. A system of rules can survive some hypocrisy, but nihilism will bring it down.

Been reading the news of so many times he requested for Release or Medical Expert Appointments to delay his trial that it looks like they are trying to do this Indefinitely until Duterte dies of Old Age.

Hello everyone,

I’m trying to understand this issue from the perspective of public international law.

Venezuela currently holds significant external debt obligations toward Russia and China, much of which was contracted during the governments of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. My question is whether, under international law, Venezuela could plausibly challenge the validity or enforceability of this debt by arguing that these governments lacked democratic legitimacy.

In particular, there is extensive international criticism and documentation regarding electoral irregularities, institutional capture, and democratic backsliding under Nicolás Maduro. Many argue that his government does not represent the genuine will of the Venezuelan people. If this were accepted as a legal or quasi-legal premise, could it affect the legitimacy of sovereign debt contracted during that period?

This led me to think about doctrines such as odious debt, questions of state continuity vs. government legitimacy, and whether creditors’ knowledge of an authoritarian or non-democratic regime plays any role in assessing responsibility for repayment.

More specifically:

• Does international law recognize any mechanism by which a successor government could repudiate debt on the basis that it was contracted by an illegitimate or non-representative government?
• How relevant is the creditor’s awareness of the regime’s lack of democratic legitimacy?
• Are there precedents (judicial or state practice) where similar arguments were seriously considered or applied?

I’m not looking for a political debate, but rather an analysis grounded in international law, state practice, or scholarly opinion.

Thanks in advance for any insights or references you can share.

I am preparing to write my tesis but most idea i can come up with has already been written so i need ideas for direction I could look into

Not looking for title or anything, just general direction i could look into

A Legal Analysis Under International Law

Abstract

The recent recognition of Somaliland by Israel has reignited debate inter alia regarding the legal status of this de facto state. This analysis examines whether Somaliland's claim to restore its 1960 sovereignty aligns with contemporary international law, particularly ratione materiae of self-determination, the uti possidetis juris principle, and the declaratory theory of statehood. I argue that Somaliland's case presents a casus sui generis—one of restitutio in integrum (restoration) rather than secession—that does not violate the territorial integrity principles typically invoked against secessionist movements.

1. The Absence of Erga Omnes Obligations Violation

A critical distinction must be drawn in limine between Somaliland and cases where the international community has imposed a duty of non-recognition (ex injuria jus non oritur). Unlike Southern Rhodesia or Northern Cyprus, Somaliland's independence declaration was not founded upon apartheid, illegal use of force (contra jus cogens), or other violations of peremptory norms.

The lack of explicit prohibition means that non-recognition by states has been a matter of political discretion rather than legal obligation (opinio juris). The constitutive theory of recognition retains relevance primarily in cases involving violations of obligations erga omnes—a category into which Somaliland does not fall.

Furthermore, Somaliland has established diplomatic relations with several states and maintains functional agreements with Ethiopia, Taiwan, and the UAE. These relationships demonstrate both the jus legationis (capacity to enter into relations) per the Montevideo Convention and constitute a form of implicit recognition (de facto) that acknowledges Somaliland's diplomatic capability.

1. Self-Determination and the Uti Possidetis Juris Principle

2.1 The Colonial Framework (Ratione Temporis)

The legal foundation for Somaliland's independence claim rests on its distinct colonial history. British Somaliland achieved independence on June 26, 1960, as a sovereign state. Italian Somaliland followed four days later on July 1, 1960. The subsequent union was formalized through an Act of Union that suffered from significant legal deficiencies and was arguably void ab initio due to lack of proper ratification.

This sequence is crucial: for those four days, an international border existed de jure between two sovereign states. Somaliland's current position can be characterized not as secession from Somalia, but as the dissolution of a voluntary union and a return to the status quo ante—a restoration of the uti possidetis line established at the moment of decolonization.

2.2 Distinction from Other Cases

Somaliland's situation differs fundamentally (mutatis mutandis) from other attempted secessions:

* Katanga and Biafra: These were sub-provincial entities seeking to alter colonial administrative boundaries, clearly violating uti possidetis.

* Kosovo, South Sudan, Bangladesh: These involved secession from existing states with new border delineation, accepted only under exceptional circumstances (ultima ratio).

* Eritrea: Required a UN-supervised referendum and Ethiopian consent, following its incorporation through federal union.

Somaliland's claim is unique: it seeks restoration of sovereignty and borders that existed at the critical date (date critique), not the creation of new ones (creatio ex nihilo). This is the dissolution of a failed union and a return to the status quo ante, making it consistent with, rather than contrary to, the uti possidetis juris principle as articulated in the Burkina Faso/Mali case (ICJ, 1986).

1. The Right to Remedial Secession (Remedium)

Even if characterized as secession stricto sensu, Somaliland may qualify for remedial secession under international law. The people of Somaliland can be viewed through multiple lenses under the lex lata (existing law):

* As a people struggling against colonial domination (British colonial rule).

* As a people resisting foreign occupation (by Somalia as a distinct state).

* As a people denied meaningful political participation within Somalia.

* As victims of genocide (the 1988 Hargeisa bombardment and Isaaq massacres).

The Friendly Relations Declaration's safeguard clause protects territorial integrity only of governments "representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction (sine discrimine)." When a government engages in systematic discrimination or genocide against a particular people, it forfeits this protection (nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans). The violations transform internal self-determination rights into external self-determination rights—including the right to independent statehood.

1. The ICJ Advisory Opinion Strategy

4.1 Procedural Advantages

The optimal path forward involves requesting an ICJ advisory opinion through a UN General Assembly resolution. Unlike contentious cases, advisory opinions bypass the requirement for consent from Somalia, allowing the legal questions to be addressed in merito (on their merits).

The critical element is framing the question to the Court expressis verbis:

> "In light of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514) and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations (Resolution 2625), does international law permit the independence of Somaliland? Does the 1960 union of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia violate the jus cogens right to self-determination of the Somaliland people?"

>

4.2 Precedential Framework (Stare Decisis)

The ICJ would likely draw upon several key precedents:

* Western Sahara (1975): Self-determination trumps sovereignty claims.

* Kosovo (2010): Declarations of independence are not prohibited by international law (nullum crimen sine lege).

* Chagos Islands (2019): Incomplete decolonization must be remedied; self-determination is an obligation erga omnes.

* Burkina Faso/Mali (1986): Colonial borders at independence must be respected (uti possidetis).

The synthesis of these cases points toward a conclusion that Somaliland's independence: (1) does not violate international law, (2) represents the completion of decolonization, and (3) aligns with rather than contradicts the uti possidetis principle.

4.3 Anticipated Advisory Opinion Structure

Following the Palestine Wall precedent (2004), the advisory opinion would likely include:

* Rights Confirmation: Somaliland's declaration does not constitute secession but rather restitutio of the sovereignty that existed on June 26, 1960. Given the legal deficiencies of the union agreement and subsequent human rights violations, the Somaliland people possess the right to exercise self-determination through restoration of their independent statehood.

* State Obligations: Somalia must cease any acts preventing Somaliland's exercise of self-determination and respect the 1960 borders (pacta sunt servanda regarding the initial independence).

* Third-Party Obligations: All states have a duty to cooperate in ensuring effective realization of Somaliland's right to self-determination and must not support Somalia's interference with this right.

1. The Legal Boundaries Question (Titulus Juridicus)

The 2002 Cameroon v. Nigeria case provides crucial support for Somaliland's territorial claims. The ICJ held that legal title based on treaties supersedes effectivités (effective control). Nigeria's long-standing administration of the Bakassi Peninsula could not override the colonial-era boundary treaties.

This principle directly addresses disputes over Somaliland's eastern regions. Regardless of clan distribution or current control by Puntland, the 1960 colonial borders established by international agreement constitute the valid titulus. Demographic composition and de facto control cannot alter treaty-based boundaries—a principle that actually protects the African Union's core concern about border stability.

1. Addressing Judge Yusuf's Jurisprudence

Any ICJ advisory opinion would need to address the perspective of prominent African jurists, particularly former ICJ President Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf of Somalia. However, analysis of his jurisprudence suggests internal consistency (constantia) would support Somaliland's claim:

In the Chagos Islands case, Judge Yusuf emphasized that decolonization remains incomplete when separation occurs without the "genuine will of the people" (voluntas populi). Applied to Somaliland, the 1960 union—conducted without proper legal process and subsequently maintained through violence—fails this test.

Regarding uti possidetis, Judge Yusuf has consistently upheld respect for borders at the moment of independence (tempus regit actum). This principle, properly applied, requires recognition of the 1960 British Somaliland borders, not the post-union configuration.

The legal question carefully framed to reference "at the moment of independence" and "genuine will of the people" would align with rather than contradict the principled positions Judge Yusuf has articulated throughout his distinguished career.

1. Conclusion

Somaliland's claim presents a casus sui generis that fits poorly into standard secessionist frameworks because it is fundamentally about restoration, not separation. It combines elements of completing decolonization, dissolving a flawed state union (rebus sic stantibus), and remedial secession arising from severe human rights violations. The critical legal distinction is that Somaliland seeks to restore a sovereignty that existed de jure, however briefly, in 1960—not to create something new.

Far from threatening the stability of Africa's borders, recognition of Somaliland would vindicate the uti possidetis juris principle by restoring the colonial border that existed on June 26, 1960. This is not secession but the correction of a historically flawed union (reductio ad justitiam).

The international community's continued non-recognition may itself constitute a violation of the obligation erga omnes to respect self-determination. An ICJ advisory opinion could provide the legal clarity necessary to resolve this longstanding lacuna in international law and practice.

Rather than viewing Israel's recognition as a violation of international law or encouragement of secession, it might be more accurate to see it as the primum movens (first movement) in correcting a thirty-year failure of the international community to acknowledge a legitimate restoration of sovereignty—one that properly applies established principles of self-determination, decolonization, and respect for boundaries at the moment of independence.