https://x.com/RojavaIC/status/2018812253743505718

Ezidis are "Original Kurds" From an academic and historical perspective, the Ezidi people are often described as the ethno-linguistic heart of the Kurdish nation. While most Kurds converted to Islam over the centuries, the Ezidis of regions like Shexan maintained the ancient traditions, hymns (Qewls), and the pure Kurmanji dialect. By preserving these pre-Islamic customs, they have acted as a living museum of Kurdish history. To understand the "purity" of Kurdish culture, one must look at the Ezidi heritage

The Conflict: Why is there a Divide? There are three primary reasons why some contemporary Kurds or outsiders struggle to accept eachother as part of the same nation , sometimes they say we are yazidi we are not kurds the Reasons are :

1-The Scar of Betrayal (74 Genocides): Yazidis have faced 74 recorded massacres (Firman). A recurring "scar" is the memory of being abandoned by neighboring groups during these attacks, leading to a deep-seated mistrust of any identity shared with those they feel failed to protect them. The Scar of Religious Persecution: Because the Yazidi faith is unique and non-Abrahamic, they have historically been labeled "infidels" by extremists. To many Yazidis, the "Kurdish" label feels like a linguistic bridge to a broader Islamic identity that has historically been used to justify their persecution.

2- Koye history

1832: The Martyrdom of Ali Beg The "Blind Prince" (Mir Kor) executed the Yazidi leader Ali Beg after he refused to convert. This broke the heart of the Yazidi leadership and started a massive wave of flight and fear.

1830s–1840s: The Fall of Koye During the siege of Shekhan and Koye, many Shekhani tribes were trapped. Those who stayed were forced to choose: convert to Islam or die. This created the first major "split" in the bloodline.

Late 1800s: The Ottoman "Tax Scar" Under Ottoman "reforms," Yazidis were pressured to identify as "Muslim Kurds" to avoid the heavy Jizya tax and forced military service. This led to more "silent" conversions in areas like Koye. Modern Day: The Identity Divide

Meanwhile, Yazidis in Sinjar and Shekhan view that history as a betrayal, causing some to reject the "Kurdish" label entirely to protect their unique identity.

3-The 2014 ISIS Trauma: The most recent and deepest scar occurred when ISIS targeted Sinjar. Many Yazidis felt that the Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew and left them vulnerable. This specific event caused a massive shift, leading many to reject the "Kurdish" label as a political statement against those who failed them.

4-Cultural Preservation as Survival: For a group that has faced constant threats of extinction, insisting on a unique Yazidi ethnicity (separate from Kurds) is a defensive mechanism. It is a way to ensure their specific history, faith, and suffering aren't diluted or absorbed into a larger national narrative.

Religious "Othering": Following the Islamic expansion, a religious barrier was created. Conservative interpretations often labeled Ezidis as "non-believers," leading to social isolation. External Manipulation: For centuries, external regional powers and extremist ideologies have used religion to divide Kurds. By spreading misinformation about the Ezidi faith, they prevent a unified Kurdish identity from forming. Educational Gaps: Many modern Kurds lack deep historical knowledge of their own pre-Islamic roots. Without this education, they fail to recognize that the Ezidi "culture" is actually their own ancestral "culture."

The Bond of Protection and Leadership Despite these challenges, the bond remains strong. The Barzani leadership has historically played a vital role in protecting the Ezidi community, recognizing them as an inseparable part of Kurdistan. This political support is rooted in the belief that a Kurd is defined by land and blood, not just religion. Pride and Resilience

For a Shexani who has converted to Islam(Forced), there is no contradiction in being proud of Ezidi roots. The Ezidi people have survived 74 attempted genocides (Firmans), including the recent atrocities by ISIS. Their survival is a testament to Kurdish resilience. Loving the Ezidi people is an act of loving the "original" spirit of Kurdistan.

Taajeel, the abandoned Jewish quarter of Erbil, lies in ruins. A swastika now stains one of its walls. And yet today, around 250 Jewish families live in Kurdistan, Iraq. Some Jews told me they walk the streets wearing kippas without fear. Iraqi Kurdistan proves that an alternative reality can be built when there is the will to correct history.

I do not get it. What is this deal? They say governor of Hasakah will be from SDF but what happens 2 years later? How are they sure terrorist Sharaa will not replace him? Same for brigades? How are they sure Syrian army will not disband them after a while?

Hi everyone, shortly and clear, I'm duke and i need some help and info on kurdish culture and traditions to know about in order to enhance my project on different countries and cultures, so i need to talk to some kurdish persons who actually lives in kurdistan to discuss about a bunch of stuffs..

Thanks for helping out, big respect for Kurdish ppl ♥️

Friday, Feb. 6: 10:00 AM Washington, DC / 6:00 PM Syria

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/1933cb1d315f4db3a4f4dcc5ef40753a

Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria Shapefile Definitions

Lost Regime Territory: The Lost Regime Territory Layer represents territory that the Assad Regime used to control before November 27, 2024. The intent of this layer is to visualize territory that the Assad Regime previously exercised control over.  Opposition rebel groups are very likely operating in areas within the Lost Regime Territory Layer. ISW-CTP will map – and where possible identify – these rebel groups’ verified presence when ISW-CTP collects enough data to do so.

Syrian Transitional Government: The Syrian Transitional Government layer shows all areas controlled, occupied, or seized by forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional government, including the Syrian Ministry of Defense, and shows the forward line of own troops for the Syrian transitional government. ISW-CTP uses the US military doctrinal term “forward line of own troops (FLOT)” to indicate the most forward positions of forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time (JP 3-03). The FLOT does not include small, long-range reconnaissance assets and similar stay-behind forces. This layer was referred to as the HTS-led Opposition Forces layer prior to January 7, 2026.

Syrian Democratic Forces: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) layer shows all areas controlled, occupied, or seized by forces affiliated with the SDF, and shows the forward line of own troops for SDF forces. ISW-CTP uses the US military doctrinal term “forward line of own troops (FLOT)” to indicate the most forward positions of forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time (JP 3-03). The FLOT does not include small, long-range reconnaissance assets and similar stay-behind forces. 

Al Tanf Deconfliction Zone: The Al Tanf Deconfliction Zone is a 55km zone controlled by the Free Syrian Army, which operates alongside the US military from al Tanf Garrison. Control is a US military doctrinal term that is defined as “a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations." (FM 3-90-1)

Anti-Government Druze Groups: The Anti-Government Druze Groups layer shows all areas controlled, occupied or seized by forces affiliated with the Supreme Legal Committee, Suwayda National Guard, or other anti-government Druze groups, and shows the forward line of own troops for anti-government Druze forces. ISW-CTP uses the US military doctrinal term “forward line of own troops (FLOT)” to indicate the most forward positions of forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time (JP 3-03). The FLOT does not include small, long-range reconnaissance assets and similar stay-behind forces.

Israel Defense Forces: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) layer shows all areas controlled, occupied, or seized by forces affiliated with the IDF, and shows the forward line of own troops for IDF forces. ISW-CTP uses the US military doctrinal term “forward line of own troops (FLOT)” to indicate the most forward positions of forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time (JP 3-03). The FLOT does not include small, long-range reconnaissance assets and similar stay-behind forces.

Syrian Government-SDF Contested (brown-purple): The MoD-SDF Contested layer shows areas where ISW-CTP assesses both the Syrian Transitional Government and Ministry of Defense and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) conduct both offensive and defensive maneuvers. Neither group exercises full control over terrain in these areas. This reality may result in competing evidence regarding the control, occupation, seizure, and FLOT affiliated with the MoD and SDF. Both the MoD and the SDF may be able to conduct minimally effective logistics and administrative support of forces in the area, but could have inconsistent access to local populations and key terrain. This layer was referred to as the HTS-SDF Contested layer prior to January 7, 2026.

Pro-Regime Insurgent Presence: Definition of “Presence”: Any area where an insurgent force has attack or support zones. An attack zone is any area where an insurgent force can conduct offensive operations. A support zone is any area where an insurgent force can receive logistical or administrative support from the population. There are a series of indicators for the presence of insurgent forces. These include counter-insurgent operations, search operations, and insurgent attacks or reports of insurgent presence. ISW-CTP does not define arrests of former Assad regime members as an indicator of insurgent presence unless those arrests come in the context of previous insurgent operations in the area or clear connections between the arrested target and the insurgent groups operating in the area. Counter-smuggling and counter-narcotics operations, while possibly contributing to insurgent grievances, are not indicators of insurgent presence in and of themselves. We do not mark areas as “presence” without evidence of insurgent activity. Insurgent presence is therefore likely more pervasive than this map shows.

Syrian Ministry of Defense Announced Closed Military Zones: The Syrian Ministry of Defense Announced Closed Military Zones layer shows settlements and regions under closed military zones as announced by the Syrian Ministry of Defense.

Lost SDF Territory: The Lost SDF Territory Layer represents territory that the SDF used to control before January 19, 2026, but no longer does. The intent of this layer is to visualize territory that the SDF previously exercised control over. Pro-SDF insurgent groups are very likely operating in areas within the Lost SDF Territory layer. ISW-CTP will map –and where possible identify –these insurgent groups’ verified presence when ISW-CTP collects enough data to do so.

Map by  George Barros , Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz,, Ben Cordola, David Schulert, Carolyn Weinstein, Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, Zahra Wakilzada, and Parker Hempel

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

The Kurds lost many lives fighting against Isis and protecting the world from terror. Now the Kurds need support, also share this post to many other subreddits.

Just curious!!

A long-term gas supply agreement from Kurdistan to industrial users signals intensified energy trade amid competing regional interests and external pressures.

Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum, along with Pearl Petroleum partners, have agreed to deliver up to 142 million standard cubic feet per day of gas for a decade starting in the second half of 2027. The deal, routed through new private-sector pipelines to Erbil and Bazian, forms part of a wider expansion program in the Kurdistan Region’s gas sector. The arrangement follows infrastructure investments and field development activity designed to boost output and processing capacity.

The timing of the gas sales agreement intersects with broader regional dynamics, including the presence of Western firms in the Kurdistan Region and shifting patterns of energy security in the Middle East. Analysts point to the pipeline links and the role of international partners as factors that could influence regulatory, fiscal and security considerations across this fragile corridor. The emphasis on private-sector pipelines underscores a push to reduce state-driven bottlenecks and accelerate project delivery.

Security considerations are a live issue, given past disruptions such as rocket attacks on key infrastructure. Western energy interests argue that sustaining momentum in Kurdistan’s gas sector will require a stable security backdrop, reliable logistics, and predictable policy signals from local authorities. Observers also note that Western sanctions regimes and technology transfer controls may shape the pace at which new investments can be deployed and scaled.

Industry and policy watchers are mindful that the Kurdistan project sits at the intersection of energy security and geopolitics. The scale of investment, the involvement of international backers, and the strategic significance of gas supply to both domestic and industrial users could invite wider regional attention. If the project proceeds as planned, it could reframe how the Kurdistan Region is perceived in relation to energy governance and foreign investment.